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L I A Z Z AT  J .  K .  B O N AT E Links between Islam and the chiefly 
clans in Mozambique have existed 
since the eighth century, when Islam 
made inroads into the northern Mo-
zambican coast and became associat-
ed with the Shirazi ruling elites. When 
the region became entangled in the 
international slave trade during the 
nineteenth century, the Shirazi clans 
secured alliances with the most pow-
erful mainland chiefs through con-
quest and kinship relations in order 
to secure access to mainland slaves. 
This process was accompanied by a 
massive expansion of Islam into the 
hinterland. The alliances between the 
Shirazi at the coast and the mainland chiefdoms resulted in a network 
of paramount chiefs and subordinate Muslim slave raiders. This net-
work also served as a marker distinguishing between themselves (the 
Maca: Muslims and “civilized”) and those to be enslaved (the Makua 
and Lomwe: derogatory terms denoting savagery, i.e., “non-Muslims” 
and “uncivilized”).
Some scholars have suggested that kinship ideology in general, and 
matriliny in particular, came under a great deal of pressure from the 
expansion of Islam.1 Nevertheless the chiefly network remained mat-
rilineal. Considering that the network was grounded on the Swahili 
(Shirazi) regional Islamic tradition, the persever-
ance of matriliny appears to be a paradox. It can 
be explained, however, by the fact that Islam was 
the domain of chiefs, whose legitimacy and au-
thority was embedded in matrilineal ideology 
of kinship and territorial/land relations of the 
region.2
Encounters with Sufism
When two new Sufi Orders, the Shadhuliyya 
Yashrutiyya in 1897 and the Qadiriyya in 1905, ar-
rived at Mozambique Island, the rest of northern 
Mozambique was still politically unstable, with 
Muslim chiefs spearheading a generalized resist-
ance against the Portuguese. Crushed at the out-
set, this resistance went on sporadically until the 
1930s. 
On launching the Shadhuliyya Yashrutiyya at 
Mozambique Island, Shaykh Muhammad Ma‘arouf 
bin Shaykh (1853–1905) of the Comoro Islands, 
gave the first ijazas (authorization) of the khalifa 
to two local Muslim chiefs.3 However, when he left 
Mozambique, a conflict over the leadership of the 
orders ensued between the chiefs and a recent Comorian immigrant. 
The fact that this Comorian did not establish kinship relationships with 
Muslim chiefly lineages undermined his religious claims in the eyes of 
local Muslims. 
The Qadiriyya reportedly was brought to Mozambique Island in 1905 
by Shaykh ‘Issa bin Ahmad al-Ngaziji (also known as al-Msujini) al-Bara-
wi, a disciple of shaykh ‘Umar Uways al-Barawi (1847–1909). He travelled 
to the mainland of Mozambique Island, Cabaceira Pequena, recruiting 
adepts from among a mixed-race Indian-African group of Muslims, who 
were descendants of the Gujarati Sunni Indian immigrants and local Af-
rican women. Despite intermarriage, the Indo-African group remained 
under Portuguese rule, which kept them separated from the rest of the 
population.
The position of Indo-Africans in rela-
tion to Africans had been safeguarded 
by the presence of the Portuguese 
administration at Mozambique Island, 
but when the administration moved to 
the southern settlement of Lourenço 
Marques (currently, Maputo) in 1896, 
the group was left without colonial 
backing. They had to arrange for their 
economic survival and compete for 
Islamic authority with the Africans. 
They controlled the Qadiriyya until 
1929, when local chiefly clans, in par-
ticular, Sayyid Ba Hasan (also known as 
Abahassan), a descendant of the local 
Shirazi rulers, stepped in to take over 
the order. He was the son of a Hadrami sharif and a relative of numer-
ous important Swahili and Muslim chiefs of northern Mozambique. 
The violent transition of the Qadiri leadership from the Afro-Indians 
to the chiefly clans set in motion the competition between the two 
groups, which continued up to the end of the colonial era, and impact-
ed the split of the orders into eight turuq. Until his death in 1963, Ba 
Hasan used his family ties, his chiefly status, and Islamic learning to ex-
pand the orders throughout Mozambican territory. As a rule, northern 
Mozambican Muslim chiefs became the leaders of the orders or they 
appointed their kin for this position. 
The integration of chiefs into the colonial system of indigenato and 
the modernization processes which took place between the 1930s and 
1970s did not halt the expansion of Islam nor impinge on matriliny 
prevailing in northern Mozambique. Individual files of the chiefs of 
the three northern Mozambican Districts collected by the Portuguese 
between 1954 and 1974 indicate that the majority of the chiefs were 
Muslims, and had mostly inherited their positions and title from their 
maternal side, as a rule from a maternal uncle.4 
Encounters with the Wahhabis
Muslim chiefly clans of northern Mozambique provided massive sup-
port to the liberation movements in the early 1960s, in part because of 
the harsh anti-Muslim policies of Portugal and in part because the Mo-
zambique liberation movements were under the patronage of TANU 
(Tanganyika African national Union) that had a wide Muslim support, 
especially from Sufi shaykhs such as Muhammad Ramiya. Between 1965 
and 1967, the Portuguese purged chiefs participating in the liberation 
movements, many of whom were arrested, murdered, and replaced 
by non-kin. Simultaneously, the colonial administration undertook a 
meticulous study of Islam and “traditional authorities.” Because Portu-
gal was concerned with the independence movements and identified 
Muslim chiefs and Sufi Orders as representing a religious leadership for 
the majority of northern Mozambican Muslim territories, it displayed a 
public support to them rather than to the Wahhabi group that began 
emerging in the 1960s. Two Afro-Indians, returning after studying in 
Saudi Arabia, founded a mostly urban-based Wahhabi group centred at 
the Anuaril Islamo mosque in Lourenço Marques. The conflict between 
them and the northern Mozambican tariqa-based and chiefly Muslim 
leadership soon escalated into direct confrontations, with the Portu-
guese intervening in favour of the Sufis. 
Muslim leadership and independence (1975–1983)
The socio-political standing of the northern Mozambican Muslim 
leadership was shaken to the core after independence. In 1977, the 
Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) adopted Marxism 
and “scientific socialism,” and sought to eliminate a wide variety of so-
Muslim leadership of Northern Mozambique 
historically has incorporated Islamic authority 
and chiefship at once. Throughout the colonial 
period, Muslim chiefs defended their version 
of Islam against non-local conceptions of 
Islam, such as Sufism and Wahhabism. After 
independence the links between chiefship 
and Islam in northern Mozambique became 
less visible. This resulted primarily from the 
policies of the post-colonial government, 
which saw African chiefship and Islam as two 
separate spheres. Islam was viewed as an 
“organized faith” similar to Christianity, while 
chiefship was understood to represent African 
“traditional authority.”
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cial practices and beliefs which they deemed “obscurantist,” 
“backward” and thus contrary to the modernist norms of 
revolutionary “scientific” socialism.5 These practices included 
the initiation rites, traditional healing, as well as ceremonies 
of ancestral supplication, all of which crucial for the legiti-
macy and authority of chiefship.
Religion was identified as another “obscurantist element,” 
and the post-independence Mozambique government 
banned religious teachings from schools, nationalized re-
ligious institutions, and harassed and persecuted religious 
leaders. With this, Muslim chiefs of northern Mozambique 
lost yet another one of the pillars of their power, that of 
Islam. 
To make matters worse for the northern Mozambican 
Muslims, a 1976 government decree outlawed associations, 
including religious ones. To counter this move the Wahhabi 
group, led by Abubacar Ismael “Mangira” met on December 
23, 1978 in the Anuaril Isslamo mosque in Maputo in order 
to delineate new strategies, especially because Anuaril Issla-
mo was an association too. They concluded that an organ 
representing all Muslims nationwide must be created in the 
face of the new circumstances. In doing so, the Wahhabis 
took advantage of the government’s ban on associations 
to establish their position as the legitimate body of Islamic 
authority and to eliminate their historical rivals once and for all. The 
nucleus of the would-be national Muslim organization was set up there 
and then, and it was presented as such to the government when in 
1981 the Frelimo decided to reconsider its positions toward Islam and 
create a national Muslim organization. 
A nation-wide Islamic organization, called the Conselho Islâmico de 
Moçambique (Islamic Council of Mozambique), was established in a 
meeting between the government and a group of Maputo imams in 
January 1981, who went on to elect Abubacar Ismael “Mangira” as its 
co-coordinator and later on its first national Secretary of the Islamic 
Council.6 As the northern Mozambican Muslims were not consulted on 
the creation of the Council, let alone invited to take part in it, its crea-
tion signalled a definitive victory of the southern Afro-Indian Wahhabis 
in their long-term historic struggle over Islamic authority against the 
northern Mozambican tariqa-based Muslim leadership. 
Northern Mozambican Muslim leadership’s disenchantment with the 
post-independence state became aggravated when Frelimo became 
associated with southern Wahhabis. The Frelimo’s favourable stance 
toward Wahhabis seems to have stemmed from the government’s per-
ception that Islam and “traditional authorities” were unrelated; from 
allegations that “traditional authorities” had collaborated with coloni-
alism and were, therefore, less nationalistic; and from the “modernist” 
outlook of the Wahhabis, who were well versed in Arabic and armed 
with university degrees and first-hand experience of Middle Eastern 
Islamic culture.
Accordingly, in 1983, Maputo Muslims who disagreed with Wahhabis 
created their own national organization, called the Congresso Islâmico 
de Moçambique (Islamic Congress of Mozambique), to which most of 
the pre-colonial associations and confraternities, including Sufi Orders, 
became affiliated. The Council attempted to de-legitimize the Congress 
in the eyes of the Frelimo government by denouncing confraternities 
and associations as incompatible with the spirit of Islam, and linking 
them to the colonial power and “traditional authority” as opposed to 
a “true” and “legitimate” Islamic authority of the ulama with “adequate” 
religious training.7 This did not result in the elimination of the Congress 
as the Council expected. From that time on, the two organizations have 
continuously competed with each other for the Frelimo party and gov-
ernment patronage, as well as for the funding of international Islamic 
NGOs. 
However, the Northern Mozambican Muslim leadership, perceived as 
both “un-modern” and either completely African “traditionalist” or fol-
lowing an Islam which had “syncretized” with these “traditions,” were 
not able to play any significant roles in the official Islamic public sphere 
or be considered as unequivocally and legitimately “Islamic.” 
Muslim leadership and liberalization (1983–2006)
Rather than relying on the culturally loaded notions of a “chief” of 
régulo, the Frelimo government has preferred to use the term “tradi-
tional authorities” to indicate a group comprised of chiefs and their en-
tourage of subordinate chiefs and healers. Realizing the social impor-
tance of this group, Frelimo gradually reinstated “traditional authority.” 
In 1989, the ban on traditional healing was lifted. After the signing of 
the peace accord in 1992, which ended the civil war with Renamo, the 
Frelimo recognized that “traditional authority” could powerfully influ-
ence voter behaviour in the first democratic election of 1994. From 1991 
to 1997, the government, through the Ministry of State Administration, 
undertook research on “traditional authorities.” In 1996 a change in the 
Constitution placed local authorities under the administrative protec-
tion of the state. The 1997 Land Law attributed legal rights within the 
State Law to “traditional authority” by recognizing the right of “local 
communities” to use land and benefit by occupation, in accordance 
with “customary norms and practices.” And finally, a government de-
cree fully reinstated the “traditional authority” in Mozambique.
While with these legal reforms the Muslim leadership in northern 
Mozambique seems to have recovered the “traditional” side of their 
authority and power, they have not been able to recapture their claim 
on Islam yet. They are still largely associated with chiefship and African 
culture rather than Islam. Because of this they are 
barely able to access benefits or gain socio-politi-
cal influence through Islamic platforms or organi-
zations. This situation has been the source of their 
continual frustration and resistance to the alleged 
racial and cultural discrimination perpetrated by 
Frelimo allied with southern Wahhabis, Afro-Indi-
ans, and Indians. 
Many northern Muslim leaders have preferred 
to perform their religious leadership through tra-
ditional patrimonial relationships thus perpetuat-
ing the links between Islam and chiefship. These 
links, historically and culturally grounded in local 
tradition, still enjoy legitimacy and positive re-
sponse in rural or peri-urban areas of northern 
Mozambique.
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